HOW TO BE A SKEPTICAL THEIST AND A
COMMONSENSE EPISTEMOLOGIST
Perry Hendricks

Trent Dougherty has argued that commonsense epistemology and skeptical
theism are incompatible. In this paper, I explicate Dougherty’s argument, and
show that (at least) one popular form of skeptical theism is compatible with
commonsense epistemology.

1. Introduction
Trent Dougherty1 has argued that commonsense epistemology and
skeptical theism are incompatible.2 In this paper, I explicate Dougherty’s
argument, and show that (at least) one popular form of skeptical theism is
compatible with commonsense epistemology.
2. Preliminaries and Dougherty’s Argument
Dougherty argues as follows:
(1) If commonsense epistemology is correct, then it is relatively easy to justifiedly believe that there exist instances of intense suffering which an
omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(2) If it is relatively easy to justifiedly believe that there exist instances of
intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have
prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting
some evil equally bad or worse, then skeptical theism is not a plausible
response to the problem of evil.

1
See his “Epistemological Considerations,” “Further Epistemological Considerations,”
and “Phenomenal Conservatism.”
2
More exactly, he claims that there is at least a superficial tension between commonsense
epistemology and skeptical theism, and he issues a challenge to skeptical theists to remedy
this tension. I use my terminology for the sake of simplicity. A referee suggests that this
makes it appear that I am addressing a straw man. However, as I show below, Dougherty
is, in fact, committed to the incompatibility of skeptical theism and commonsense epistemology, since, by his definitions of them, they entail contradictory propositions (i.e., (7) and
(8)). See n. 5 for more on this.
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(3) Therefore, if commonsense epistemology is correct, then skeptical theism is not plausible.3

He states the evidential argument from evil as:
[4] There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
[5] An omnipotent, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
[6] [Therefore,] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly
good being.4

Finally, Dougherty states the skeptical theist position and commonsense
epistemology as follows:
[MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM] The only evidence for [premise (4)]
is that there are instances of intense suffering for which we cannot think of
some greater good which would have been lost if it were prevented or some
evil equally bad or worse which would have resulted if it were prevented,
and . . . furthermore we have no reason to suppose that we would be able to
think of such if it existed.5
[COMMONSENSE] If it seems to S that P, then S thereby has a reason to
believe P.6

So how does COMMONSENSE come into conflict with MAINSTREAM
SKEPTICAL THEISM? It does so as follows: COMMONSENSE entails that
S can have evidence or reason7 to affirm premise (4) simply in virtue of the
fact that it seems to her that there are instances of gratuitous8 evil, and this
seeming justifies her in holding such a belief. So, COMMONSENSE entails
the following:
“Epistemological Considerations,” 172.
“Epistemological Considerations,” 173.
5
“Epistemological Considerations,” 173 (emphasis added). He gives several other
examples of skeptical theism later in his paper. I choose this version only for the sake of convenience; everything I say in this paper is applicable to the other forms of skeptical theism
Dougherty mentions as well. Moreover, he thinks that all skeptical theists are committed to
MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, since, prior to his above characterization of skeptical
theism, he says, “Skeptical theists in one way or another reply that . . . ” (“Epistemological
Considerations,” 173). Hence, he thinks that all skeptical theists are committed to MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, and hence what I say about MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL
THEISM will apply to his other characterizations of skeptical theism.
6
Dougherty, “Phenomenal Conservatism,” 23. This principle is from Michael Huemer’s
phenomenal conservatism. See, e.g., Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, and “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.”
7
For the sake of simplicity, I will be taking “evidence” and “reason” to be synonymous.
8
A gratuitous evil (or instance of suffering) is an evil that God could have prevented
without losing a greater good or permitting an evil that is equally bad or worse. I will, therefore, use the term “gratuitous evil” as shorthand for the instances of intense suffering that
Dougherty describes in premises (4) and (5).
3
4
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(7) Possibly, S is justified in endorsing premise (4) in virtue of the fact
that it seems to her that premise (4) is true.
MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, on the other hand, claims that the
only evidence for premise (4) is (and can be) our inability to think of a
greater good for an instance of intense suffering, and hence the only justification S can have for endorsing premise (4) is her inability to think of a
greater good (etc.). Hence, MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM entails
(8) It is not possible for S to be justified in endorsing premise (4) in
virtue of the fact that it seems to her that premise (4) is true.
Thus, COMMONSENSE and MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM entail contradictory propositions and are therefore incompatible. Further,
it follows that, insofar as COMMONSENSE is plausible, MAINSTREAM
SKEPTICAL THEISM is implausible. Hence premise (2) is true.9
3. A Different Type of Skeptical Theism
The proper response to Dougherty, in my view, is to concede that COMMONSENSE and MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM are, indeed,
incompatible. However, it is important to note that MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM is not a thesis that all skeptical theists endorse. Indeed,
one of the most popular versions of skeptical theism—Michael Bergmann’s10—radically differs from MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM.
We may state it as follows:
BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM:
ST1		 We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know
of are representative of the possible goods there are.
ST2		 We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of
are representative of the possible evils there are.
ST3		 We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we
know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils
are representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods and the permission of possible evils.

9
Dougherty brings out the tension between these two positions in a different way than
I do. He says that MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM, if right, must provide S, who
believes premise (4) on the basis of COMMONSENSE, with a defeater for her COMMONSENSE justification. But he doubts that MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM can provide
such a defeater. Hence, a tension has arisen. It should be clear how my reply below equally
applies to Dougherty’s way of bringing about the tension. (It is worth emphasizing again that
Dougherty’s definitions of skeptical theism and commonsense epistemology entail propositions (7) and (8), so my approach is not unfaithful to his basic thesis.).
10
See, e.g., Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from
Evil,” “Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil,” “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” and
“Skeptical Theism, Atheism, and Total Evidence Skepticism.”
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ST4		 We have no good reason for thinking that the total moral value or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects
the total moral value or disvalue they really have.11

What should be clear is that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM
does not make any claims about what evidence can or does justify one
in endorsing premise (4).12 Rather, it only makes claims about our lack of
reasons for thinking that certain values (and entailment relations) are representative.13 Indeed, as Chris Tucker has pointed out, BERGMANNIAN
SKEPTICAL THEISM does not defeat all arguments from evil since there
are arguments that do not make use of an inductive inference that is vulnerable to Bergmann’s skeptical theses.14
However, it is important to note that Bergmann never claimed that his
skeptical theses defeat all arguments from evil! Indeed, he says the following:
[Proponents of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM] don’t claim that
their skeptical theses undermine all arguments from evil . . . [BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is] used by the skeptical theist to target inductive inferences from God-justifying reasons we can think of . . . to the conclusion that there are no God-justifying reasons for permitting the evils we
know of. . . . But this doesn’t show that all arguments from evil rely on inductive
inferences.15

Thus, the proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM ought to
concede that not all evidential arguments from evil are undermined by
her skeptical theism. Hence, she ought to reject MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM and allow that there may be multiple ways to motivate or
justify one in endorsing premise (4).
Since the affirmation of MAINSTREAM SKEPTICAL THEISM is what
brought the skeptical theist into conflict with COMMONSENSE, Dougherty’s challenge is met; the proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL
THEISM is not committed to (8), and hence she is not in conflict with (7),
and thus she is not in conflict with COMMONSENSE. (Indeed, we may
go further and say that, in principle, one who endorses BERGMANNIAN
SKEPTICAL THEISM may have reason or justification, by COMMONSENSE, to endorse premise (4). More on this later.) Therefore, one may
endorse both BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM and COMMONSENSE; their plausibility is compossible. It follows from this that premise
Bergmann “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 11–12.
Of course, the proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM could go beyond
the skeptical theses and make claims about what kinds of evidence or justification for
premise (4) there could (and could not) possibly be. My point is merely that her theses do
not commit her to doing so.
13
Of course, thesis (4) has other implications, but I will gloss over them here for the sake
of simplicity.
14
Tucker, “Why Skeptical Theism Isn’t Skeptical Enough.”
15
Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism, Atheism, and Total Evidence Skepticism,” 210 (emphasis
added).
11
12
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(2) of Dougherty’s argument is false: Skeptical theism does not entail that
one cannot relatively easily justifiedly believe that there are instances of
gratuitous evil—or, at least, one popular form of skeptical theism does
not entail this.16 Therefore, Dougherty’s conclusion is avoided: Skeptical
theism—or, at least one form of it—is not incompatible with COMMONSENSE; COMMONSENSE, if plausible, does not render skeptical theism
implausible.17
4. Is BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM’s Scope Narrow?
One might wonder whether the compatibility of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM with COMMONSENSE is a double-edged sword: While
it is an advantage for BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM to be able
to accommodate COMMONSENSE, it appears to narrow its scope and
thus make it an ineffective response to many arguments from evil. In this
section, I will address this issue, arguing that (a) BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM, even when conjoined with COMMONSENSE, still hits
its original target, and hence its scope is not narrowed, and that (b) BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is still, for many persons, an effective
response to many arguments from evil.
In accommodating COMMONSENSE, it might be objected that the
proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM leaves herself vulnerable many arguments from evil, such as the one contained in (4)–(6).
Hence, its scope is narrowed.18 The reasoning behind this charge is twofold. In the first place, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM itself does
nothing to undermine either premise (4) or premise (5); BERGMANNIAN
SKEPTICAL THEISM targets certain inductive inferences (explained
below), none of which are mentioned in premises (4) or (5). In the second
place, the compatibility of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THIESM and
COMMONSENSE entails that one can have COMMONSENSE justification for arguments from evil (e.g., (4)–(6)); since BERGMANNIAN
SKEPTICAL THEISM is compatible with COMMONSENSE, its proponent
cannot wield it to combat arguments from evil predicated on, or justified
by, COMMONSENSE. Thus, argues the objector, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM’s scope is narrowed; it does not address arguments from
evil that do not make use of an inductive inference, nor does it address
COMMONSENSE based arguments from evil. Is this objection successful?
16
It is worth noting that the above defense can also be applied to Daniel Howard-Snyder’s
stronger “Agnostic Theses” defended in his “Epistemic Humility,” as well as other forms of
skeptical theism.
17
A referee asks whether a person S would be justified by COMMONSENSE in rejecting
BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM if it seems to her to be false. If the answer is “Yes,”
then, the referee says, COMMONSENSE and BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM are
not compatible. This is incorrect. COMMONSENSE and BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL
THEISM are compatible in the sense that one does not entail the denial of the other. That fact
does not change by conceding that some persons in some situations may have COMMONSENSE justification for rejecting BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM.
18
This objection is owed to a referee.

350

Faith and Philosophy

It is true that the proponent of both BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL
THEISM and COMMONSENSE ought to concede that, for example, if it
seems to S that premises (4) and (5) are true, then S may justifiedly accept
(6). (Note that while some allege that they have this type of justification,
I doubt that premise (4)—or any proposition asserting that there is gratuitous evil—seems true to anyone. It is analogous, in my view, to a person,
after witnessing a natural human birth, claiming that it seems to her that
there is no possible pain more intense than giving birth. Or to a person,
upon seeing Mount Everest, claiming that it seems that Mount Everest is
the tallest mountain in the universe. Even if one testified to having such
seemings, I would doubt the veracity of her testimony—she would appear
merely to be confused; it is doubtful that she understands what she is
saying.19 But I will put my incredulity aside for the moment.)
This outcome will be true for any other version of the argument from
evil: so long as the premises seem to be true to S, she will be justified in
accepting the conclusion. Or, more concretely, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM permits that S may, via COMMONSENSE, justifiedly
conclude that God (at least probably) does not exist if an instance of evil
seems gratuitous to S and S holds that God’s existence is incompatible
with gratuitous evil.
However, the crucial issue is whether this concession actually narrows
the scope of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM. Does it? I submit
that it does not. Recall that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM
targets arguments from evil that make use, implicitly or explicitly, of inductive inferences. More specifically, it targets arguments that make use of
inductive inferences like the following:
THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE:20 We do not know of any morally justifying reason for God to allow instances of intense suffering; therefore,
probably, there is no such reason.
BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM renders THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE (and other inferences like it) bad. Hence, arguments from evil that
rely on it will be undermined.21 COMMONSENSE does not magically turn
19
If a person really claimed that it seemed to her that Mount Everest is the tallest mountain in the universe, we ought to ask her if she just means that Mount Everest seems very tall.
Presumably, this—or something like this—is what she meant by her utterance. Similarly, if a
person claims that it seems to her that there are instances of suffering such that the elimination of such instances would not have resulted in a loss of a greater good or a production of
an evil that is equally bad or worse, we ought to ask her if she just means that an evil seems
particularly intense or bad. Presumably, this—or something like this—is what she meant by
her utterance. (If she doubles down and says that she really does mean that it seems to her
that there are instances of suffering such that their elimination would not have resulted in
the loss of a greater good (etc.), then I would, again, doubt the veracity of her testimony or
whether she understood the question.)
20

This term is taken from Stephen Wykstra “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil.”

In this essay, I merely assume that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM undermines
THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE. This is because (a) this has been substantially argued for
elsewhere (see below), and (b) my paper is concerned primarily with the compatibility of
21
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a bad inference into a good one, and hence COMMONSENSE does not
narrow the scope of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM.
Here it might be objected that if it seems to S that THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE is a good inference, then S thereby has justification for affirming
it. And hence COMMONSENSE does undermine the efficacy—narrow
the scope—of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM.
It is, of course, possible that it seems to S that THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE is good. But S, in such a case, would not have justification via
COMMONSENSE for her belief, for she has a defeater for it. That is, the
fact that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM renders THE NOSEEUM
INFERENCE bad is a defeater for S’s seeming; it blocks—or, at least, nullifies—any justification S would have via COMMONSENSE.22 (This is
similar to a situation in which it seems to S that a stick in the water is bent
and yet she lacks justification via COMMONSENSE for her belief that it
is bent, since she has an undercutting defeater for her seeming.) Hence,
COMMONSENSE does not threaten to narrow the scope of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM. It does not provide justification for THE
NOSEEUM INFERENCE.
So, the original target of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM—arguments that are, implicitly or explicitly, predicated on THE NOSEEUM
INFERENCE—is still hit, and COMMONSENSE does nothing to undermine this. This, I will argue, enables BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL
THEISM to remain an effective response to many arguments from evil for
many of its proponents. The reason I use the qualification “for many” is
because COMMONSENSE delivers person-relative justification: If it seems
to S that p and it does not seem to R that p, only S will have justification
for p. The relevance of this will become clear below.
To see how BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM can remain an effective response for many to arguments from evil, consider the following
skeptical theism and commonsense epistemology, not with arguments in favor of skeptical
theism. For defenses of the thesis that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM undermines
THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE, see, e.g., Bergmann “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil” and “Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil,” Hudson “The
Father of Lies?” and A Grotesque in the Garden, and my “Sceptical Theism and the Evil-God
Challenge.”
22
Perhaps one might object that the defeater is the other way around: S’s COMMONSENSE justification gives her a defeater for her belief that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL
THEISM undermines THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE. I do not, at this point, wish to wade
into the deep waters of defeaters here, but I will briefly explain why I do not think that
this objection works. BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM functions as an undercutting
defeater for THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE: It provides S with knowledge that it is a bad
method of producing beliefs, and therefore it gives her reason to remain agnostic about the
product of THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE (i.e., that there probably is no morally justifying
reason for intense instances of suffering)—at least that is what we have assumed in this essay
(see n. 21). Thus, since THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE is known to be bad, a seeming will not
erase this fact, and this is a defeater for any seeming that THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE is
good. Consider another example: If S knows that X is a bad method for producing beliefs,
then the fact that it seems to her that X is a good method will not provide her with justification for holding beliefs produced by X.
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scenario. Suppose that the proponent of the argument from evil as stated
in (4)–(6), call her “P,” presents her interlocutor, call her “L,” with premise
(4). L, we may suppose, is a proponent of BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL
THEISM and COMMONSENSE. However, L does not have COMMONSENSE justification for premise (4) (i.e., it does not seem to her to be
true). What is P to do here? Well, P must find some other way to motivate
premise (4) for L—she must give L good reason to endorse premise (4).
What reason could she give? One way—perhaps the only way—would be
for P to present L with THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE. Suppose that P indeed uses THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE to argue in favor of premise (4).
What is L to make of P’s argument? She will not be impressed or moved by
P’s case for premise (4). This is because, as mentioned above, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM renders THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE bad,
and hence premise (4) will remain unmotivated for L. Thus, P’s original
argument has not gotten off the ground—she has not given L good reason
to accept premise (4).23
Therefore, I conclude, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is still
relevant to the argument contained in (4)–(6)—at least, it is relevant if the
person entertaining it does not have justification via COMMONSENSE for
premise (4).
This same problem will arise for any argument from evil that contains
a premise stating either that there is gratuitous evil or that there probably
is gratuitous evil. If L does not have COMMONSENSE justification for the
premise about gratuitous evil, then P will have to offer additional support
for said premise.24 If the additional support amounts to THE NOSEEUM
23
To make this clearer, we can consider a different scenario. Suppose, instead, that P owns
a 500-acre strawberry field and that she prides herself on having no rotten strawberries in
her field. In an attempt to convince L that there are no rotten strawberries in her field, P
takes L to her field and they examine five acres of it. After finding no rotten strawberries, P
asks L whether she now believes her. Does L now accept that P has no rotten strawberries
in her field? If L has reason to doubt that the five acres they searched are representative of
the whole garden, then she does not accept P’s claim. If she has reason to doubt that the five
acres are representative, then she and P not finding a rotten strawberry is scant evidence for
there being none in her field. If she has reason to doubt that the contents of the 495 acres
of the garden resemble the five acres that they searched through, should she regard their
coming up empty-handed in their search as good reason to think that there are not rotten
strawberries in the rest of the garden? The answer is simple: She should not. As it is with the
strawberry garden, so it is with P’s argument for premise (4): L should not accept it.
24
I suspect that some arguments that do not mention gratuitous evil at all may nevertheless be vulnerable to BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM. For example, Paul Draper
(“Pain and Pleasure”; “The Skeptical Theist” “Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism”) has
argued that P(O/HI) >! P(O/G), and that this gives us reason to reject G. (Read: the probability of our observations about the patterns of pain and pleasure in our world (O) on the
hypothesis that sentient beings and nature in our world are not the product of a benevolent
(or malevolent) non-human person (HI) is antecedently much greater than the probability
of O on the hypothesis that God, an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being, is the
responsible for the existence of sentient beings and nature (G) (“The Skeptical Theist,” 189).)
However if we find P(O/G) to be inscrutable, then Draper must give us reason to assign a
(presumably, low) value to it; if P(O/G) is truly inscrutable, then we cannot reasonably say
that O is more likely on another proposition. One such reason might go like this: if there is no
morally justifying reason for God allowing (or causing) O, then P(O/G) is low. We know of no
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INFERENCE (or something like it), then BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL
THEISM comes into play, leaving the premise unmotivated for L and thus
undermining P’s argument. Insofar as many (most? all?) persons do not
have COMMONSENSE justification for believing that there is gratuitous
evil,25 many arguments from evil will require additional support for
their premises asserting that there is gratuitous evil. And insofar as the
additional support offered amounts to THE NOSEEUM INFERENCE (or
something like it), BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM will continue
to apply to many arguments. So, I suggest that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is still an effective response to many arguments from evil
for many persons; for those who lack COMMONSENSE justification for
believing there is gratuitous evil, BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM
continues to undercut many arguments from evil.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have seen that (at least) one form of skeptical theism is
compatible with COMMONSENSE, and hence we ought to reject premise
(2) of Dougherty’s argument. I do not claim that BERGMANNIAN SKEPTICAL THEISM is the only form of skeptical theism that is compatible
with COMMONSENSE—there are no doubt others. My point is merely
that not all skeptical theists are committed to their incompatibility.26 A
lesson from this is that we ought to talk about the implications of types of
skeptical theism, rather than skeptical theism simpliciter.27
Trinity Western University
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